On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court invalidated the statutory for-cause-removal protections for commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission in a 6-3 decision.
The case, Trump v. Slaughter, established that commissioners of independent agencies serve at the pleasure of the President and can be removed without any showing of malfeasance or neglect of duty.
The ruling extends beyond the FTC, covering commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
The Court grounded its decision in the Constitution’s requirement that executive power be vested in a single individual, adopting the so-called unitary executive theory in its reasoning.
The majority held that “[s]ubordinates who exercise the President’s power are subject to removal by him. Then and only then, can they remain accountable to the President, and the President to the people.”
Slaughter overrules the Court’s 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which had upheld for-cause-removal protections for heads of multimember expert agencies wielding quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions.
The Court found that the FTC now exercises executive authority because it engages in substantial investigative and prosecutorial functions, requiring unqualified presidential removal authority over those who hold such powers.
One notable exception emerged in a companion ruling, Trump v. Cook, also issued on June 29, in which the Court recognised the independence of the Federal Reserve System based on its historical lineage as successor to the First and Second Banks of the United States.
Both Slaughter and Cook were written by Chief Justice Roberts, though neither decision goes to great length to acknowledge the other or explain how they are consistent.
Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion raised the broader question of whether Congress would have granted agencies as much power as it did, had it known that agency heads could be removed by the President at will.
Justice Gorsuch further noted that the accumulation of executive, legislative, and judicial authority within a single agency accountable to the President may offend the Constitution, suggesting courts apply nondelegation and major questions doctrines to limit executive encroachment.
Independent agencies have historically retained insulation from presidential directives, but that changed when the President signed an Executive Order imposing various mandates on independent agencies, including submission of major regulatory actions to the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.
Under Slaughter, an agency head’s refusal to comply with the OIRA regulatory review process can now be enforced through the removal of the non-complying official.
Several statutory provisions conferring agency independence remain in unresolved legal territory after Slaughter, including requirements limiting the number of commissioners from any one political party and provisions mandating staggered terms of particular lengths.
For businesses, the prospect of sharper and faster policy reversals following each change in administration may create regulatory challenges that are increasingly difficult to navigate.