The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has amended a recent ruling, bringing significant clarity to Title VII religious accommodation cases across the circuit.
The amended decision, issued on September 15, 2026, revisited a two-month-old ruling that had dismissed discrimination claims stemming from an employer’s denial of a COVID-19 vaccine religious exemption.
At the centre of the case is *Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System*, which involved an officer who requested a religious exemption from a mandatory vaccination requirement.
The New York Unified Court System denied the request after the employee initially failed to answer supplemental questions, and the employer subsequently refused to reconsider the decision.
The employee was later placed on administrative leave and ultimately discharged, setting the stage for a significant legal challenge over Title VII protections.
In its original July 15, 2026, ruling, the Second Circuit found the employee had failed to bring a prima facie case for failure to accommodate under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The court held that to establish a prima facie case, an employee must allege a need for religious accommodation, that “the employer’s desire to avoid” the accommodation “was a motivating factor,” and that an adverse employment decision occurred.
The amended opinion adds a footnote making clear the court does “not suggest that a new, heightened discriminatory motive requirement exists in failure-to-accommodate cases.”
The Second Circuit further stated that “an employee asserting a failure-to-accommodate claim need not show that an employer’s denial of an accommodation was motivated by discriminatory animus against religion.”
The ruling draws on the 2015 Supreme Court decision in *EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.*, which established that employees need not inform employers of accommodation needs to assert a Title VII claim.
That Supreme Court precedent requires only that the employee show the employer was motivated by the need for a religious exemption when making an adverse employment decision.
A second footnote added in the amended decision clarified that the employee’s discharge alone “constitutes a cognizable adverse employment action” in this particular case.
The court noted it therefore “did not need to and did not decide whether the failure to accommodate itself constitutes an adverse employment action,” leaving that broader question unresolved.
For employers, the decision provides meaningful authority to defend against religious accommodation denial claims where an employee cannot establish a proper prima facie case.
The ruling confirms that when employees fail to satisfy the *Abercrombie* standard, their claims may be dismissed before an employer is required to demonstrate undue hardship, a notable procedural protection.