Grocery workers forced to stand outside locked stores before their shifts begin may be entitled to pay for that waiting time, a federal appeals court has ruled.
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revived a putative collective and class action against discount supermarket chain Lidl on October 13, 2026.
The case, Santos v. Lidl US, LLC, centres on opening-shift employees at two Lidl stores on Long Island who were required to report fifteen minutes before their listed start time.
Because the time clocks were located inside the store, employees could not clock in until a manager arrived to unlock the doors.
Approximately once a week, the opening manager did not arrive until 5:00 a.m. or later, leaving workers standing outside unpaid for the duration of the wait.
The Second Circuit held that this waiting time is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, rejecting the argument that the Portal-to-Portal Act shields the employer from liability.
The court drew on a U.S. Department of Labor regulation distinguishing between employees who are “engaged to wait” and those merely “waiting to be engaged.”
An employee required to report at a particular hour, ready and willing to work, who cannot begin for reasons beyond their control, falls into the former category under that regulatory framework.
The majority also cited the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, which acknowledged that analysis would differ if an employer required employees to arrive at a specific time in order to begin waiting.
Lidl had argued that nothing prevented employees from using the time for personal purposes or even leaving the car park entirely, a position the majority panel rejected based on the facts as alleged.
The panel also relied on the Supreme Court’s 1944 phrasing in Armour and Co. v. Wantock, quoting directly: “Readiness to serve may be hired, quite as much as service itself.”
Lidl had additionally cited Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, a 2014 Supreme Court ruling, to argue that requiring an activity does not automatically make it compensable.
The panel declined to read that precedent so broadly, distinguishing between whether an activity is integral to productive work and whether an employer has chosen to hire workers to simply be present and ready.
The court also refused to dismiss the case on de minimis grounds, finding it could not rule as a matter of law that fifteen minutes per week was too trivial or too difficult to record.
Judge Sullivan dissented, characterising the pre-shift wait as a routine part of the plaintiff’s preliminary activities, though the majority argued the once-a-week delays were an aberration rather than the routine.
This ruling is a pleading-stage decision, meaning Lidl retains the ability to contest whether early arrival was genuinely required and to press a de minimis defence on a fuller factual record.
For employers across the Second Circuit, the practical message is clear: if workers are required to report at a set time, the compensable clock should be treated as starting upon their arrival.
Ensuring that a manager with a key is present before employees are due to report would help businesses avoid the precise situation that gave rise to this litigation.