A coalition of 15 governments pledged in late September 2026 to pursue asset freezes, visa restrictions, and criminal liability against anyone knowingly supporting 24 designated criminal organizations across the Americas.
The Shield of the Americas initiative, which would not have taken shape without significant pressure from Washington, marks a decisive shift toward multilateral enforcement that extends well beyond traditional U.S. sanctions tools.
Just one week earlier, President Trump had sent Congress a formal determination identifying several Latin American countries as major drug transit or illicit drug-producing jurisdictions for fiscal year 2027.
That determination called out Brazil specifically, citing the government’s failure to confront Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho, both of which the U.S. State Department had already designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations earlier in 2026.
A September 9 action by the Office of Foreign Assets Control added further urgency, targeting not only an alleged criminal organization but also entities accused of supporting it through digital currency and associated financial services.
For multinationals operating across Latin America, the cumulative effect of these three developments is a compliance environment that is materially more demanding than it was twelve months ago.
The central challenge is that enforcement attention has moved well beyond designated cartel leaders to the commercial, financial, and logistical networks that keep those organizations functioning on a daily basis.
Criminal groups frequently exert influence through family members, trusted lieutenants, or minority stakeholders who exercise effective operational control yet fall outside straightforward ownership-percentage tests, making routine list screening inadequate.
OFAC’s 50% rule already treats any entity owned directly or indirectly by blocked persons at that threshold as itself blocked, but opaque nominee structures and incomplete beneficial ownership records can leave that exposure invisible to companies relying solely on published sanctions lists.
Protection payments embedded in distributor margins, inflated freight invoices used to move value, and informal “community fees” paid by local contractors are among the mechanisms through which otherwise legitimate businesses can inadvertently fund designated organizations.
Ports and border crossings represent a particular vulnerability, since criminal organizations frequently seek influence over inspection and routing processes, and facilitation payments to customs brokers can mask extortion or smuggling arrangements that regulators may later characterise as material support.
The growing reliance on fintech platforms, digital assets, and payment aggregators creates additional exposure, as these channels offer criminal groups opportunities to move funds with limited transparency through infrastructure that multinationals themselves may operate or depend on.
Labor and security arrangements carry similar risks, with private security firms, trucking contractors, and site-access providers in some markets operating under the influence or infiltration of criminal groups whose fees function as recurring protection payments.
Compliance experts advise that generic anti-corruption or sanctions frameworks are no longer sufficient, and that companies should conduct granular risk assessments specifically mapped to their transportation routes, customs intermediaries, payment flows, and local labor arrangements in higher-risk jurisdictions.
Enhanced due diligence on third parties should go beyond list screening to include beneficial ownership reviews, adverse media analysis, scrutiny of subcontracting chains, and contractual provisions requiring disclosure of downstream partners alongside audit rights and termination triggers.
Finance and operations teams need practical, real-time escalation procedures for unusual payment requests, including fees routed to unrelated parties, unexplained invoices, or transactions passing through unfamiliar financial channels, rather than processes that function only in theory.
Monitoring should extend to domestic enforcement developments across relevant Latin American jurisdictions, not only to U.S. measures, given the explicit intent of the Shield of the Americas participants to pursue their own asset freezes and criminal liability provisions.
Role-specific training for procurement, logistics, treasury, and local management functions should focus on operational red flags rather than abstract legal definitions, equipping staff to recognise warning signs before they escalate into enforcement matters.
The trajectory of 2026 enforcement actions suggests that companies treating criminal-organisation risk as a peripheral compliance concern are likely to find that ordinary commercial operations, viewed in hindsight by regulators, constituted material support for the very networks now being targeted.

