A Texas appeals court has reversed a trial court’s ruling against two will contestants who alleged that a page in their father’s will had been forged or altered.
The case, Estate of Wynn, centres on the will of William Reese Wynn Sr., who died in 2021, leaving a 2003 document that primarily benefited his wife Susan.
The will included $25,000 bequests to each of Wynn’s two children from a previous marriage, Carol and William Jr., but also contained an in terrorem clause that would revoke any bequest to a beneficiary who contested the will.
The children challenged the will, claiming that page three had been forged or altered, and submitted declarations stating they were familiar with their father’s handwriting and that the initials on that page were not his.
The executrix filed a no-evidence motion for partial summary judgment, arguing there was no evidence to support the contestants’ claim that the will had been forged or altered between its execution and admission to probate.
The trial court sided with the executrix, granting her motions for summary judgment, excluding the contestants’ expert testimony, and subsequently declaring that the in terrorem clause had been triggered, effectively stripping the children of their bequests.
The Waco Court of Appeals took a different view, finding that the contestants’ declarations met the standard for admissible lay opinion evidence under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence.
The court noted that the contestants had provided detailed factual accounts of how they had personally witnessed their father’s handwriting throughout their lives, including around the time the will was signed, and had not merely offered bare conclusions.
The appeals court ruled that the contestants’ declarations were not conclusory because they provided the underlying facts to support their lay opinions, distinguishing the case from prior precedent requiring technical handwriting analysis.
Because the declarations were improperly excluded, the court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the will admitted to probate had been forged, meaning the no-evidence summary judgment should not have been granted.
The ruling on the in terrorem clause followed directly from the forgery finding, with the court concluding that the existence of a genuine factual dispute over forgery necessarily created a factual dispute over whether the contestants had just cause to bring their claims.
Under Section 254.005(a) of the Texas Estates Code, a forfeiture clause is unenforceable if the party who brought the action establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that just cause existed and the action was brought and maintained in good faith.
The appeals court held that the executrix had not met her summary judgment burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the contestants violated the will’s in terrorem clause.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment in full and remanded the case for further proceedings, leaving open whether the no-contest clause will ultimately be enforced.