Law Scholar Shaun Ossei-Owusu Exposes What Legal Education Gets Wrong

After earning a PhD in African American Studies at Berkeley, Shaun Ossei-Owusu took an unconventional path into the legal world, one driven by research rather than courtroom ambition.

He completed a fellowship at the American Bar Foundation before deciding to pursue law school, not to practise law, but to acquire the technical vocabulary the discipline demands.

His goal was to close the gap between how the legal system describes itself and how it actually operates for the people caught inside it.

That intellectual mission has now taken shape in a new book, titled Law on Trial, which examines the mechanics and moral trade-offs of legal practice.

In conversations surrounding the book, Ossei-Owusu argues that the process of learning to “think like a lawyer” carries hidden costs that legal education rarely addresses openly.

Law school curricula, he contends, routinely omit significant areas of legal reality, with civil asset forfeiture serving as one prominent example of a topic that goes largely untaught.

The consequence is that graduates enter practice without a full picture of how law functions at its rougher edges, where power and procedure intersect in ways classrooms avoid.

Ossei-Owusu also turns his attention to Biglaw and government lawyering, environments where institutional pressure to win can displace more searching ethical questions.

The drive to secure a favourable outcome, he suggests, can quietly push aside the more uncomfortable question of whether that outcome was the right one to pursue in the first place.

His work ultimately offers practical guidance for lawyers attempting to remain honest with themselves about the compromises their careers inevitably require them to make.

The book arrives at a moment of sustained public scrutiny over access to justice, legal costs, and whether elite legal training serves the broader public interest or primarily reinforces existing hierarchies.

Ossei-Owusu’s background in African American Studies gives his legal analysis a distinctive lens, one attentive to the historical patterns that formal legal language can obscure or legitimise.

Law on Trial positions itself not as a cynical critique but as a rigorous attempt to hold the profession to the standards it publicly claims to uphold.